Andrew McAninch, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
- Milwaukee WI UNITED STATES
- Grohmann Museum: GM317
- Humanities, Social Science and Communication
Dr. Andrew McAninch specializes in ethics and applied ethics, with an emphasis on bioethics, engineering ethics, and ethics of AI.
Education, Licensure and Certification
Ph.D.
Philosophy
Indiana University Bloomington
2012
B.A.
Philosophy and English
The University of Iowa
2001
Biography
Areas of Expertise
Social
Media Appearances
Guest speaker on Professional Ethics for Engineers
American Society of Plumbing Engineers, WI chapter, HGA Architects and Engineers
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
2023
Subject Matter Expert
Wisconsin State Journal article on WI state AI task forces print
2023
Subject Matter Expert
CBS58 News
CBS58 report on AI chatbots and student cheating
2023
Panelist
PBS Milwaukee
PBS Milwaukee discussion of documentary film Coded Bias
Milwaukee, WI
2021
Event and Speaking Appearances
Demystifying the Science and Ethics of Generative AI: Some Lessons for the Life Sciences (with Dr. Jeremy Kedziora)
Protecting Future Generations- Impacts of Generative AI Beyond Plagiarism: A World BioEthics Day Event Milwaukee School of Engineering, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 2023
Ethical Implications of Teaching and Learning Post-GPT (with Dr. Julian Friedland and Dr. Steve May)
32nd Annual Conference of the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics Portland, Oregon March 2-5, 2023
Machine Learning and Reflective Agency
32nd Annual Conference of the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics Portland, Oregon, March 2-5, 2023
Machine Learning and Reflective Agency
Values in Medicine, Science, and Technology (VMST) Annual Conference University of Texas at Dallas, Dallas, Texas May 19-22, 2022
Moral Distress Across the Professions: Some Parallels and Their Limitations
Center for Bioethics and Medical Humanities Grand Rounds Speaker Series Medical College of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Wisconsin May 17, 2022
Moral Distress Across the Professions: Some Parallels and Their Limitations
30th Annual Conference of the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, February 25-27, 2021 Virtual Conference
Go Big or Go Home? Micro-ethics, Macro-ethics, and the Deliberative Perspective in Engineering Ethics Education
Values in Medicine, Science, and Technology (VMST) Annual Conference University of Texas at Dallas, Dallas, Texas May 29-31, 2020 (accepted for presentation 4-2-2020, VMST conference cancelled due to coronavirus pandemic)
Two Perspectives on the Value of Deliberative Reasoning
Illinois Philosophical Association Annual Conference Normal, IL, 2019
Recent Adventures in Engineering Ethics
Professional Engineers Advancing Knowledge (PEAK) Education Seminars MSOE
What is the Value of Deliberation?
3rd Annual Tennessee Value and Agency Conference: Reason, Sentiment, and Sensibility in the Moral Life University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN
What is the Value of Deliberation?
Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress University of Colorado, Boulder, CO
Evolution and the Value of Deliberative Reasoning
40th Conference on Value Inquiry: Evolution and the Foundations of Ethics Neumann University, Aston, PA
Research Grants
CREATE CLO Integration Grant (semester course release)
Milwaukee School of Engineering
2024
CREATE Curriculum Integration Grant
Milwaukee School of Engineering
2022
Summer Development Grant, Bioethics
Milwaukee School of Engineering
2020
Protracted Leave
Milwaukee School of Engineering
2019
Course Development Grant for Ethics of Digital Technologies and Artificial Intelligence
Milwaukee School of Engineering
2018
Course Development Grant for Philosophy of Mind and Artificial Intelligence
Milwaukee School of Engineering
2017
Selected Publications
Go Big or Go Home? A New Case for Integrating Micro-ethics and Macro-ethics in Engineering and Education
Science and Engineering EthicsMcAninch, A.
2023-05-17
In this paper, I make a novel case for an expansive approach to engineering ethics education, one that regards micro-ethics and macro-ethics as essentially complementary. Although others have voiced support for including macro-ethical reflection within engineering ethics education, I advance a stronger claim, arguing that isolating engineering ethics from macro-level issues risks rendering even micro-ethical inquiry morally meaningless. I divide my proposal into four parts. First, I clarify the distinction between micro-ethics and macro-ethics as I am construing it, defending my characterization against a potential worry. Second, I consider but reject some arguments for a restrictive approach, one that excludes macro-ethical reflection from engineering ethics education. Third, I offer my central argument for an expansive approach. Finally, I suggest that macro-ethics education can learn something valuable from micro-ethics pedagogy. On my proposal, students consider both micro- and macro-ethical problems from the deliberative perspective, situating micro-ethical problems within a broader social framework but also situating macro-ethical problems within an engaged, practical framework. By emphasizing the value of the deliberative perspective, my proposal contributes to a growing call to broaden the scope of engineering ethics education while maintaining its practical relevance.
Regret
International Encyclopedia of EthicsBaron, M., McAninch, A.
2019-06-29
DOI: 10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee743.pub2
Hopes and Misconceptions: Comment on Gert*
American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and MedicineMcAninch, A.
*Accepted for publication Fall 2018; newsletter discontinued by APA prior to scheduled publication.
Moral Distress, Moral Injury, and Moral Luck
The American Journal of BioethicsMcAninch, A.
2016
Moral Distress, Moral Injury, and Moral Luck unacceptable course of action. Vague speculation, groundless fears, and imaginary devils do not justify knowingly doing the wrong thing. By the same token, additional information can markedly change the picture, lending credibility to actions that formerly appeared unacceptable. Equally important, one should search for viable, reduced risk avenues for accomplishing the moral objective. Quite possibly, other team members are also uncomfortable. Thoughtful conversation and …
Activity, Passivity, and Normative Avowal
Pacific Philosophical QuarterlyMcAninch, A.
2015
The idea that agents can be active with respect to some of their actions, and passive with respect to others, is a widely held assumption within moral philosophy. But exactly how to characterize these notions is controversial. I argue that an agent is active just in case (A) her action is one whose motive she can truly avow as reason‐giving, or (B) her action is one whose motive she can disavow, provided her disavowal effects appropriate modifications in her future motives. This view maintains a link between activity, reason‐responsiveness, and answerability, while avoiding commitments to an implausible theory of motivation.
Acting for a Reason and Following a Principle
Ethical Theory and Moral PracticeMcAninch, A.
2015
According to an influential view of practical reason and rational agency, a person acts for a reason only if she recognizes some consideration to be a reason, where this recognition motivates her to act. I call this requirement the guidance condition on acting for a reason. Despite its intuitive appeal, the guidance condition appears to generate a vicious regress. At least one proponent of the guidance condition, Christine M. Korsgaard, is sensitive to this regress worry, and her appeal in recent work to the constitutive principles of action can be seen, in part, as a response to it. I argue, however, that if we are to appeal to the constitutive principles of action to resolve the regress, then we must determine whether acting on such principles is also subject to the guidance condition. This raises a dilemma. If following these principles is subject to the guidance condition, then the regress remains unresolved. But if not, then the rationale for applying it to acting for a reason vanishes as well. I conclude that we should embrace an account of acting for a reason that rejects the guidance condition.
Animal Communication and Neo-Expressivism
The Philosophy of Animal MindsMcAninch, A., Goodrich, G., Allen, C.
2009
One of the earliest issues in cognitive ethology concerned the meaning of animal signals. In the 1970s and 1980s this debate was most active with respect to the question of whether animal alarm calls convey information about the emotional states of animals or whether they “refer” directly to predators in the environment (Seyfarth, Cheney, & Marler 1980; see Radick 2007 for a historical account), but other areas, such as vocalizations about food and social contact, were also widely discussed.
